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Inequality, Inequity Aversion, and the Provision of Public Goods 
 
We investigate the effects of inequality in wealth on the incentives to contribute to a public 
good when agents are inequity averse and may differ in ability. We show that equality may 
lead to a reduction of public good provision below levels generated by purely selfish agents. 
But introducing inequality motivates more productive agents to exert higher efforts and help 
the group to coordinate on equilibria with less free-riding. As a result, less able agents may 
benefit from initially disadvantageous inequality. Moreover, the more inequity averse the 
agents, the more inequality should be imposed even by an egalitarian social planner. 
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 1 Introduction
There is now a broad number of studies indicating that many people tend to
dislike inequity. Formal models of inequity aversion such as those by Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) or Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) have been quite successful
in explaining patterns of behavior observed in laboratory experiments and
in the ￿eld.1 In this paper we analyze the e⁄ect of ex-ante inequality in
wealth on the motivation of heterogeneous and inequity averse agents to
contribute to a public good. While a straightforward conjecture would be
that inequity aversion should lead to the optimality of a more egalitarian
wealth distribution, we show that the optimal degree of wealth inequality
may actually increase with the importance of inequity aversion in the agents￿
preferences.
We consider a simple setting in which two agents who are inequity averse
simultaneously decide on their contributions to a public good. The joined
output is increasing in each agent￿ s contribution but both agents may have
di⁄erent abilities which determine the marginal e⁄ect of their contributions.
When both agents bene￿t to the same extent from the public good, equality
in initial wealth may then lead to inequity as the more able agent provides
higher inputs and, in turn, has higher costs. We show that this inequity is
endogenously o⁄set to some degree as the agents adapt their contributions.
Treating unequal agents equally may then have detrimental e⁄ects for the
provision of the public good. But allocating a higher wealth to the more able
agent may motivate the latter to increase her contribution. When the wealth
di⁄erential is aligned to the di⁄erence in abilities, there will be multiple
equilibria in which the agents attain the same utility even though their initial
wealth di⁄ers. In these equilibria both agents have an incentive to match
1For experimental evidence see for example Roth and Kagel (1995), Camerer (2003) and
Engelmann and Strobel (2004). Using a more general notion of fairness, ￿eld evidence is
given by e.g. Blinder and Choi (1990), Agell and Lundborg (1995), Campbell and Kamlani
(1997), Bewley (1999) and Carpenter and Seki (2006). For a summary of the empirical
evidence on social preferences see for instance Fehr and Schmidt (2002) and Sobel (2005).
2their group-members￿contribution and, in turn, the free-rider problem can
be substantially reduced when the agents coordinate on the Pareto-dominant
equilibrium. In particular, for intermediate levels of wealth inequality both
agents exert higher e⁄orts relative to the e⁄orts maximizing their material
payo⁄s.
We further analyze the optimal degree of inequality for two simple set-
tings. In the ￿rst setting, we analyze the agents￿individual preferences for
redistribution of a given amount of total initial wealth. Here, we show that
the less able agent may even bene￿t from ex-ante wealth inequality to her dis-
advantage. The reason is that the increased incentives of the more able agent
to contribute to the public good can outweigh the loss in ex-ante wealth. In
the second setting, we show that not only a utilitarian but also an egalitar-
ian social planner will choose an unequal wealth distribution favoring the
more productive agent. Most strikingly, the stronger the agents￿inequity
aversion, the larger should be the di⁄erence in initial wealth. Moreover, we
show that an egalitarian wealth distribution can only be optimal when all
agents have the same ability. On the contrary, in the case of heterogeneous
agents such a policy always leads to a stronger underprovision of the public
good causing welfare losses. Finally, we demonstrate that under the opti-
mal distribution of wealth, total contributions are independent of the group
composition, i.e. homogeneous and heterogeneous groups provide the same
amount of the public good and identical levels of social welfare are attained.
In the existing public good literature, a well established result is that
the private provision of a public good is una⁄ected by any reallocation of
income amongst contributing agents. This result has ￿rst been shown by
Warr (1983) and later been extended by Bergstrom et al. (1986). However,
the latter also shows that an income redistribution which increases inequal-
ity by transferring wealth from non-contributing individuals to contributing
individuals can have positive welfare e⁄ects (see also Itaya et al. (1997)). In
a similar vein, Andreoni (1990) argues that public good provision can be en-
3hanced by redistributing wealth from less altruistic to more altruistic people.
We add to this literature by showing that redistribution can be bene￿cial
even for the case of symmetric preferences and even if the set of contributors
is left unchanged. While the reason for inequality in our model stems from
the heterogeneity in the agents￿characteristics, the agents￿fairness concerns
appear to be an important factor in￿ uencing the optimal degree of inequality.
In recent years, there also has been a couple of (predominantly experimen-
tal) studies investigating the e⁄ects of wealth heterogeneity on public good
provision. However, empirical results from these studies are not clear-cut.
While some papers ￿nd that inequality leads to lower contributions (e.g. Os-
trom et al. (1994), Van Dijk et al. (2002), Cherry et al. (2005) and Anderson
et al. (2008)), other studies report a neutral or even positive e⁄ect of wealth
inequality (e.g. Chan et al. (1999), Buckley and Croson (2006)).2 One rea-
son for the non-conclusive evidence might be that these studies investigated
inequality only in the income dimension. Yet, the claim of our study is that
there is an interplay of inequality in the income dimension and heterogeneity
in the agents￿characteristics that a⁄ect ￿psychological￿inequity costs which
might hamper the cooperation in social dilemmas.
In this regard, our paper also contributes to the literature on the inter-
play of equity and equality in social exchanges (e.g. Homans (1958), Adams
(1965), Konow (2000), Cappelen et al. (2007) or Konow et al. (2009)). Psy-
chological equity theory (Adams (1965)) for instance argues that individuals
do not strive to receive equal bene￿ts or make equal contributions as long
as the ratio between bene￿ts and contributions is similar. Analogously, we
show that if agents are su¢ ciently heterogenous, i.e. if the di⁄erence in abil-
ities (and hence their inputs) is large, equity between agents is only feasible
when initial wealth levels are unequal suggesting that (in)equality does not
necessarily imply (in)equity and vice versa.
2Chan et al. (1996) ￿nd evidence which in line with the model of Bergstrom et al.
(1986) on an aggregate level but not an individual level.
4Applied to a team context within ￿rms, our study provides insights on
the question whether equal wages are always the best wage policy. While it
has often been argued that unequal reward schemes provoke morale prob-
lems among co-workers leading to lower performances (e.g. Akerlof and
Yellen (1990), Bewley (1999)), some other studies questioned whether equal
payment, realized by wage compression, does eliminate all these problems.3
Winter (2004), for instance, shows that it might be even optimal to reward
identical agents di⁄erently as coordination can be improved which has re-
cently be con￿rmed in an experiment by Goerg et al. (2010). In another
experiment, Abeler et al. (2010) ￿nd that paying equal wages after an un-
equal performance may lead to inequity and, in turn, to substantially lower
e⁄orts and a decline in e¢ ciency over time. But while these papers argue for
inequality in ex-post performance rewards, our paper shows that it may even
be optimal to introduce ex-ante inequality in the non-performance contin-
gent wage components. Furthermore, our paper also adds to the literature
on behavioral contract theory studying the e⁄ects of inequity aversion on
incentives.4 However, while in most of the studies inequity aversion leads to
more equal payment structures, our model shows that inequity aversion may
be a reason to introduce ex-ante inequality.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The model is de-
scribed in Section 2. Section 3 presents the equilibrium analysis. In Section
4 we compare the e⁄ort levels chosen by inequity averse and purely sel￿sh
agents. Section 5 analyzes preferences for redistribution and examines the
e⁄ects of distribution policies and group composition on the public good
provision and social welfare. Section 6 concludes.
3See e.g. Lazear (1989) who argues that ￿... it is far from obvious that pay equality
has these e⁄ects￿ .
4For a theoretical investigation of this topic see for instance Itoh (2004), Grund and
Sliwka (2005), Huck and Rey-Biel (2006), Demougin et al. (2006), Fehr et al. (2007),Rey-
Biel (2008), Dur and Glazer (2008), Mohnen et al. (2008), Kragl and Schmid (2009),
Neilson and Stowe (2010), Bartling and Von Siemens (2010) and Englmaier and Wambach
(2010).
52 The Model
Two agents i and j can both contribute to a public good. An agent￿ s contri-
bution depends on her e⁄ort ei and her ability ai. Individual e⁄ort costs are
linear in the exerted e⁄ort and equal to c ￿ ei, c 2 R+. The group output is






The agents directly bene￿t from a higher group output. Each agent receives
a share ￿ of the group output indicating her individual valuation of the public
good (marginal per capital return). Furthermore, each agent i is provided
with an initial endowment wi.5 Let ￿wi = wi￿wj be the di⁄erence in initial
endowments. Both agents are inequity averse with a Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
type utility function. An agent￿ s utility is6












￿￿ ￿ ￿ if ￿ < 0
￿ ￿ ￿ if ￿ > 0
where ￿ measures the ￿psychological costs￿of disadvantageous inequity and
￿ that of advantageous inequity. Following Fehr and Schmidt (1999) we
assume that ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0: Additionally, we assume that ￿ ￿ 1
2.7
5In a team context, ￿ represents e.g. the degree of team identi￿cation or the intrinsic
bene￿t of the work output and wi represents the wage.
6Hence, we allow that the disutility from inequity v (￿) depends on the di⁄erence of
the agents￿net-wealth (rewards minus costs of e⁄ort).
7Note that ￿ > 1
2 connotes a very strong form of inequity aversion implying that ex-
post, agents would be willing to donate parts of their wealth to less wealthy group members
up to the point where wealth levels are completely equalized (compare Rey-Biel (2008)).
We discuss implications of this assumption at the end of Section 3.
63 Equilibrium Analysis
Each agent i maximizes
max
ei








￿ c ￿ ei ￿ v (wi ￿ c ￿ ei ￿ wj + c ￿ ej):
The function is continuous but not continuously di⁄erentiable as it has
a kink at ei =
￿wi
c + ej where i attains the same utility as j. O⁄ the kink,





i < 0. As the right-sided
derivative at the kink is strictly smaller than the left-sided derivative, the
function is strictly concave.
We have to consider two possible equilibrium types depending on whether
there is inequity in equilibrium or whether both agents are equally well o⁄.
In an inequitable equilibrium one agent i is better o⁄ given the chosen e⁄ort
levels, i.e. wi￿cei > wj￿cej. Suppose that such an equilibrium exists. When














￿ ￿c = 0:














Such an equilibrium exists if at these e⁄ort levels we indeed have that wi ￿
cei > wj ￿ cej or















This directly leads to the following result:












an inequitable equilibrium exists in which















Note that both agents adapt their e⁄orts as the contribution of the fa-
vored agent i increases in the degree of ￿compassion￿ ￿ and that of her
disadvantaged counterpart j decreases in the degree of ￿envy￿￿. Still, they
here end up a situation which is inequitable ex-post. But as the result shows
this is only the case when ex-ante inequality is su¢ ciently large.
We now have to check whether there are also equitable equilibria in which
both agents attain the same payo⁄. In that case wi￿cei = wj￿cej and both







can be sustained in such an equitable Nash equilibrium
if no agent has an incentive to deviate. As the function is strictly concave,
necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence of the equilibrium are







, the right hand side derivative negative and wi￿ce￿
i =
wj ￿ ce￿








































































From these conditions the following result can be derived:






















































Inserting the equity condition (6) in conditions (4) and (5), we can conclude
that an e⁄ort level e￿











































the set is non-empty for certain values of ￿wi if
￿2a2
i
4(1 ￿ ￿)2c2 ￿
￿2a2
j






























This result has several interesting implications. First, note that there
are always multiple equitable equilibria. The reason is that inequity averse
agents have some interest to adapt their own e⁄ort according to the group
member￿ s e⁄ort in order to avoid the disutility from inequity. This leads to
a coordination problem as the reaction functions are upward sloping.
Second, the set of equitable equilibria de￿ned by (7) is the larger, the
higher the agents￿degree of inequity aversion: The more the agents care
for equity, the larger is their willingness to adapt their e⁄orts to reduce
inequity which may either be triggered by inequality in initial wealth or the
group member￿ s e⁄ort level. The lower boundary of the equilibrium set is
decreasing in ￿ as more ￿envious￿agents are willing to reduce their e⁄orts
to avoid being worse o⁄ than their group member. Analogously, the upper
boundary is increasing in ￿ as more ￿compassionate￿agents are more willing
to raise their e⁄orts to reduce a group member￿ s disadvantage. Likewise, the
set de￿ned by (8) is also increasing in the agents￿inequity aversion implying
that the stronger the agents￿aversion against inequity, the larger may be the
maximal initial wealth inequality the agents are willing to o⁄set by adapting
their contributions ending up in an equitable equilibrium.
Third, note that the lower boundary for ￿wi as de￿ned by condition
(8) exceeds zero (or the upper boundary is smaller than zero) when the
abilities di⁄er strongly and inequity aversion is not too strong. In these cases,
equitable equilibria never exist when ￿wi = 0 and, hence, equity cannot be
attained when wealth is distributed equally. The reason is that due to the
10higher marginal productivity of e⁄ort, the more productive agent will have
a higher incentive to exert more e⁄ort than her less productive fellow agent
and, in turn, bears higher costs. But as both agents equally bene￿t from the
public good the more able agent is worse o⁄when both have the same initial
wealth.8






4(1+￿)2c2 respectively. Hence, an agent never chooses an e⁄ort
level of 0. Figure 1 shows the sustainable equilibrium e⁄ort levels of both
agents i and j as a correspondence of ￿wi.9 There are two cut-o⁄ values for









































4(1+￿)2c2. For intermediate values of
￿wi equitable equilibria exist.








Figure 1: E⁄ort Choice of agent i (left) and j (right) depending on ￿wi
Note that as both agents attain identical payo⁄s in an equitable equilib-
rium, they prefer the same one. Consequently, it is important to compare
8Note that this is always the case when the agents are purely sel￿sh (i.e. ￿ = ￿ = 0).
9The ￿gure shows a setting in which ai = 12; aj = 10; ￿ = 0:4; ￿ = 0:2; ￿ = 0:2; and
c = 1.
11the di⁄erent feasible equitable equilibria with respect to the agents￿utility
which leads to the following result:
Corollary 1 As long as ￿ ￿ 1
2 the highest feasible equitable equilibrium is
always Pareto optimal.
Proof: See the appendix.
To understand this result note that there is a free-rider problem which
is particularly strong when agents are sel￿sh. Inequity aversion helps to
overcome this free-rider problem as it allows agents to coordinate on higher
e⁄ort levels which come closer to the ￿rst best. As long as ￿ does not exceed 1
2
the highest feasible equilibrium is still lower than the ￿rst-best and therefore
is preferred by the agents. With a ￿ larger than 1
2, however, inequity aversion
becomes so strong that an agent even would have an incentive to match an
ine¢ ciently high e⁄ort level chosen by her group member even though both
would be better o⁄ with a lower e⁄ort.
Hence, both agents bene￿t from playing the equitable equilibrium with
the highest sustainable e⁄ort level when they are not extremely ￿compassion-












strictly increasing in the degree of advantageous inequity aversion ￿.
4 Do Inequity Averse Agents Contribute More?
We now compare the attained e⁄ort levels with those chosen by purely sel￿sh
agents to study the e⁄ects of inequity aversion on the motivation to con-
tribute to the public good. From Propositions 1 and 2 as well as Corollary 1
(assuming that the agents play the Pareto best equitable equilibrium)10 we
10Cooper et al. (1992), Blume and Ortmann (2007) for instance ￿nd experimentally
that simple ex-ante cheap talk communication indeed very frequently leads to the choice
of the pareto e¢ cient Nash equilibrium in coordination games. See Demichelis and Weibull
(2008) for a theoretical argument based on lexicographic preferences for honesty.
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as depicted by the solid upper boundary of the graphs in Figure 1. Note that
both functions are continuous and weakly monotonic.
Suppose, w.l.o.g., that i is the more able agent i.e. ai ￿ aj. Purely
sel￿sh agents￿e⁄ort choices are not a⁄ected by initial wealth inequality as
they consider only their marginal returns when choosing their e⁄orts. Hence,












By comparing these e⁄ort levels of sel￿sh agents with those of inequity
averse agents as given by (9) we obtain the following result:























j ). If ￿wi is larger than the upper boundary of this set inequity aver-







j ). The opposite holds when ￿wi is smaller than
the lower boundary.




























11To see that, just replace ￿ = ￿ = 0 in the equilibrium e⁄orts given by (2).








































Hence, we can conclude that e￿
i > e
selfish










4(1￿￿)2c which gives us the








Hence, the initial wealth di⁄erential ￿wi is crucial to determine how in-
equity averse agents distort their e⁄ort choices relative to the e⁄orts maximiz-
ing their material payo⁄s. For intermediate levels of initial wealth inequality,
inequity aversion indeed helps to reduce the free-rider problem as both agents
contribute more when coordinating on the Pareto-superior equilibrium.
But if initial wealth inequality becomes stronger, inequity aversion leads
to an asymmetric reaction as the favored agent chooses a higher e⁄ort than
the level maximizing her material payo⁄ and the disadvantaged contributes
less than would be optimal from a payo⁄ maximizing perspective.
But it is important to note that the latter demotivating e⁄ect may arise
for the more able agent even when she is richer than her less able colleague:










Hence, when ai is much larger than aj or when ￿ is su¢ ciently small, the
more able agent reduces her e⁄ort below e
selfish
i unless ￿wi exceeds a strictly
positive cut-o⁄value. Or, in other words, she has to be paid su¢ ciently more
than her colleague or otherwise will reduce her e⁄ort below the sel￿shly opti-
mal level. To understand the reason for this e⁄ect, note again that the payo⁄
12Note that this cut-o⁄ is indeed always in the interior of the relevant interval.
14maximizing e⁄ort is always larger for the more able agent as her marginal
returns to e⁄ort are higher. As both equally bene￿t from the public good,
she is worse o⁄ than her less able colleague when both have the same initial
wealth. But when being inequity averse she su⁄ers from this disadvantage
which is the higher the larger ai relative to aj. If ￿ is high, the more able
agent will still choose an equilibrium e⁄ort level above e
selfish
i as also her less
able but ￿compassionate￿counterpart puts in a su¢ ciently high e⁄ort and
they can coordinate to a superior equilibrium. But when ￿ is small, she can
only reduce inequity by lowering her e⁄ort. Hence, not awarding the more
able agent more money up front leads to an unfair distribution of payo⁄s
and, in turn, to lower e⁄orts.
5 Social Welfare, Redistribution, and Group
Composition
We proceed by analyzing redistribution preferences of a) the agents and b)
a social planner who can allocate a ￿xed budget. We further investigate the
welfare consequences of a policy implementing an egalitarian wealth distri-
bution irrespective of the distribution of the agents￿abilities. Finally, we
examine the e⁄ect of group composition under the optimal distribution of
the initial wealth.
5.1 Individual Preferences for Redistribution
We ￿rst study the agents￿ex-ante preferences on the initial wealth di⁄erential
￿wi when they take into account their equilibrium e⁄ort choices. These
considerations will be a useful starting point for welfare analysis. To do that,
it is instructive to consider a situation in which a certain budget W = wi+wj
can be distributed between the two agents. By inserting the equilibrium e⁄ort
choices (9) into the agents￿utility functions we can describe their utility as
15a function of the initial wealth di⁄erential ￿wi. Analyzing the shape of the
indirect utility functions we obtain the following result:




















an agent i￿ s utility is strictly in-
creasing in ￿wi. But between these two cut-o⁄ values it is strictly decreasing.











Proof: See the appendix.
This result is illustrated in Figure 2. The solid line shows agent i￿ s utility
and the dashed line agent j￿ s utility both as a function of ￿wi.13 For ex-
treme values of ￿wi each agent bene￿ts from a redistribution in her favor and
























terests are fully aligned. The reason is that within this interval only equitable
equilibria exist, and hence, any ex-ante inequality in wealth will be o⁄set by
adapted e⁄ort levels. Moreover, all values of ￿wi within this interval are











this point, agents can coordinate on an equilibrium leading to the highest
contributions.
Proposition 4 has several interesting implications. Consider the situation
of an individual agent who can (re-)distribute a given wealth allocation.
Interestingly, an individual may bene￿t from ex-ante redistribution at her
own expense as the following result shows:
Corollary 2 If both agents receive the same initial wealth (i.e. ￿wi = 0)
the less able agent j can be made better o⁄ by reducing her own initial wealth
13The ￿gure shows a setting in which ai = 12; aj = 10; ￿ = 0:4; ￿ = 0:2; ￿ = 0:2; and
c = 1.





























If ￿ is smaller than this cut-o⁄, such a transfer is still bene￿cial for agent j

















Proof: See the appendix.
Hence, a less able agent can be better o⁄ ex-post when sacri￿cing parts
of her initial wealth which are then transferred to a more able individual.
She then bene￿ts from this colleague￿ s higher willingness to contribute to the
public good and this helps to reduce the free-rider problem. Interestingly, this
17is always the case irrespective of the di⁄erence in abilities if ￿ is su¢ ciently
large. Moreover, note that the cut-o⁄ value for ￿ is equal to 1
3 when ￿ = 0
and strictly decreasing in ￿. Hence, this condition holds for moderate values
of ￿ even when the agents only su⁄er from disadvantageous inequity. The
reason is that a more able agent resents being worse o⁄ than her less able
colleague when exerting a higher e⁄ort due to her higher productivity. But
she is willing to exert higher e⁄orts when she earns more. Therefore, a less
able agent may bene￿t when her colleague￿ s income is increased because, in
turn, this colleague is willing to contribute more.
If ￿ is rather small, the result still holds if the less able agent￿ s produc-
tivity is not too small relative to her more able colleague￿ s productivity. If,
however, her ability is much smaller the transfer necessary to implement a
performance maximizing equitable equilibrium is too large such that agent j
prefers to stick with the case in which both receive the same initial wealth
although this leads to a lower group output.
5.2 Social Welfare
We now study a situation in which an external authority can decide on the
distribution of wealth. To do so, we consider, a social planner who has a social
welfare function which is either egalitarian (i.e. who wants to maximize the
utility of the least well-o⁄) or utilitarian (i.e. wants to maximize the sum of
both agents￿utility). It directly follows from Proposition 4 that such a social
planner always has a dominant choice:












Proof: It is straightforward to see that within the set of initial wealth di⁄er-
entials inducing equitable equilibria both egalitarian and utilitarian planners










as at this spread, both the sum and the
18minimum of the agents￿utilities are maximized. Moreover, for an egalitar-
ian social planner any wealth di⁄erential which is not inducing an equitable
equilibrium is always dominated by this choice as the utility of the least well
o⁄ agent is always lower in an inequitable equilibrium. To see this formally
note that when, w.l.o.g., j is favored
@ui
@￿wi = 1
2 + ￿ > 0 for all ￿wi inducing
an inequitable equilibrium (see (12) in the proof of Proposition 4) and as
the utility function is continuous, i￿ s utility is always larger in an equitable
equilibrium.
A utilitarian social planner will neither choose a wealth distribution in-
ducing an inequitable equilibrium, as in an inequitable equilibrium which,
w.l.o.g., favors agent j; the marginal gain from transferring money to agent i
@ui
@￿wi = 1
2 + ￿ is always larger than j￿ s marginal loss which is equal to 1
2 ￿ ￿
(see again (12)).
Hence, even an egalitarian social planner who only considers the utility of
the least well o⁄individual should allow for inequality in ex-ante wealth. The
reason is that it is precisely this ex-ante inequality induces an equilibrium in
which equity is attained ex-post and in which the more able agent is willing
to contribute more. This observation bears some resemblance to the result by
Andreoni (1990) who argues that redistribution of income will increase the
total contribution if it bene￿ts the more altruistic individuals.14 It directly
follows that the implementation of an egalitarian wealth distribution policy
has detrimental e⁄ects if the group considered is not entirely homogenous in
terms of abilities.
5.3 The Optimal Group Composition
So far, we only considered how wealth should be distributed treating the
composition of agents within a group as exogenously given. However, it is
14Similarly, with respect to social welfare, Thurow (1971) argues that some redistribution
of income is necessary in order to achieve a Pareto optimum.
19also interesting to study the case in which the formation of groups can be
determined as well. A straightforward conjecture is that group composition
matters for the willingness to contribute if the agents are inequity averse
towards their fellow group members. To investigate this, we consider a simple
situation in which there are two agents of high and two of low ability that
can be assigned into two groups of two. By comparing total contributions,
we can derive the following result:
Proposition 5 If all agents have the same initial wealth, total contributions
are always higher with homogenous than with heterogenous groups. But when
wealth can be adapted optimally, total contributions are independent of the
group composition.
Proof: Let aH > aL be the ability of the high and low productive agent and
let wH and wL denote the initial wealth levels of the two agents, respectively.
Given the same initial wealth (￿w = wH ￿ wL = 0) the total contribution




















































In both cases, the expression is strictly smaller than (11).









































20But this is equal to the total contribution of the homogenous groups which
is again given by (11) as ￿w￿ = 0 is optimal in this case.
Hence, when the wealth level is ￿xed and equally distributed it is ben-
e￿cial to have homogenous groups. The reason is straightforward from the
analysis above: Heterogeneity in abilities leads to a de-motivation of the
more quali￿ed agent when wealth is equally distributed. By matching agents
into homogenous teams, this de-motivational e⁄ect can be avoided and group
homogeneity helps the agents to coordinate on more favorable equilibria.
It is, however, interesting to note that group composition is irrelevant
for total contributions when the wealth level can be optimally adapted. In
this case,be the disadvantage of the more able agent can be entirely o⁄set
and, in turn, motivation to contribute is restored to the levels attainable in
homogenous groups.
6 Conclusion
We analyzed the e⁄ects of wealth inequality on the incentives to contribute
to a public good when agents are inequity averse. We have shown that it
is optimal to introduce ex-ante inequality in wealth if agents di⁄er in their
abilities. The reason is that inequality in favor of a more able agent can
motivate this agent to exert higher e⁄orts. In particular, the stronger the
agents￿inequity aversion, the stronger is also this incentive e⁄ect of inequality
and the larger should be the di⁄erence in initial wealth. Furthermore, we
have shown that compared to the case when agents are purely self-interested,
contributions are higher when agents are inequity averse as inequity aversion
helps to reduce the free-rider problem and agents can coordinate on higher
e⁄orts.
Our results have several interesting implications. First of all, they cast
doubt on simple statements sometimes heard in practice claiming that in-
21equality among the members of a group is demotivating when people care
for fairness. While this is indeed true for very large wealth di⁄erentials in
our model, the opposite can also be the case, when wealth di⁄erentials are
too small. Allocating agents of di⁄erent abilities the same initial wealth can
lead to highly inequitable situations. The reason is that in a public good set-
ting, all agents equally bene￿t from the group output, but more able agents
exert higher e⁄orts as their marginal returns to e⁄ort are higher and, in turn,
they incur higher costs. When agents are inequity averse this can demoti-
vate the more able agents which is bad for the overall performance as their
contributions are more valuable.
The results also may cast some light on the discussion about distributional
politics (Alesina and Angeletos (2005), Durante and Putterman (2009)) and
the e⁄ects on citizens￿willingness to voluntary donate to a common good.
Some previous studies (e.g. Warr (1983) and Bergstrom et al. (1986)) have
argued that the total provision of a public good is independent of the dis-
tribution of wealth. In contrast, our results indicate that equality in wealth
may crowd-out the motivation to contribute. But introducing inequality may
have positive e⁄ects on the citizens￿willingness to work for the common good.
However, our model also shows that this is the case only if the higher wealth
is in the hands of those who can provide the most valuable contributions.
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277 Appendix
Proof of Corollary 1:
The value of emax
i directly follows from the upper boundary given by (7). Let
v
E










be agent i￿ s utility which is equal to agent j￿ s utility in any equitable equi-
librium. To compare the equilibria in the set de￿ned by (7) we have to check



















































￿ 0 is a necessary and su¢ cient
condition for emax














































































as long as ￿ ￿ 1
2. Hence,
both agent￿ s utility is maximal at emax












i is equal to
￿2a2
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is again equivalent to ￿ ￿ 1
2.
Proof of Proposition 4:
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for any ￿ ￿ 1
2
and equal to zero if and only if ￿ = 1
2:
Similarly, the slope in third interval is strictly negative if
1
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and ￿ ￿ 1











2 and equal to zero if and only if ￿ = 1
2:
30Proof of Corollary 2:










if agent j￿ s utility function is increasing at ￿wi = 0





















If this is not the case we have to compare the utility of the less able agent






























































+ 1 ￿ 4(1 ￿ ￿) ￿












< 0 this holds for all
values of aj. As 4￿ ￿ 3 < 0 this condition is equivalent to
 












2 ￿ 7￿ + 2
￿
Note that 6￿
2￿7￿+2 > 0 as this function is = 0 at ￿ = 1
2 and decreasing
31for 0 < ￿ < 1















which proves the ￿rst claim. If, however,
￿
4(1￿￿)2















+ 1 ￿ 4(1 ￿ ￿) ￿






which establishes the second claim.
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